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PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE
ANTI-TRUST LAWS
By JOHN F. O'DEAt
If, of late, you have observed that the sport pages are being read by
persons who apparently are unaware of the difference between a split T
and a split bat, you may credit the United States Supreme Court with the
broadened interest in this section of the newspaper. Decisions affecting professional operation in the realm of sports have aroused the interest of legal
scholars. Congress likewise has been piqued to inquiry by diverse rulings
in an area long considered to be beyond the bourn of the anti-trust statutes.
The status of commercialized sport in relation to the Clayton and Sherman Acts was first seriously considered in 1922 in the case of FederalBaseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of ProfessionalBaseball Clubs.'
The action, instituted in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,
was the outgrowth of an aborted attempt to establish a third major league
of baseball teams. The plaintiff was the Baltimore Club of the short-lived
Federal Baseball League. The parties defendant were both major leagues,
the National League and the American League, the various member clubs
of such leagues and several individual league and club officials. The complaint alleged a monopoly of the business of baseball effected by a National
Agreement and a National Commission which dominated and controlled
the whole structure of baseball, minor leagues as well as major leagues. The
term "Organized Baseball" was employed to indicate all who were subject
to the National Agreement. The complaint recited the formation and attempted operation of the Federal League, the combination and conspiracy
of "Organized Baseball" to destroy such competition and the ultimate
elimination of the Federal League.
The trial court was so impressed by the evidence in support of the complaint that Judge Stafford held as a matter of law that the defendants had
attempted to monopolize the business of baseball and a part of interstate
commerce, leaving to the jury the question of fact as to whether the Federal
League was destroyed by the conduct of "Organized Baseball." The jury
found in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $80,000, which was trebled
in accordance with the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.'
'IMember of the San Francisco Bar. Member of the California Bar. A.B. University of
San Francisco, 1932; LL.B. University of San Francisco School of Law, 1935.
1259 U.S. 200 (1922).
226 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
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An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia 3 The reviewing court raised the query:
"Did the giving of exhibitions of baseball under the circumstances disclosed
in the record constitute trade or commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act? ' 4
In answer to the question raised the court quoted from various cases,
definitions of "trade" and "commerce," and concluded:
"Through these definitions runs the idea that trade and commerce require
the transfer of something, whether it be persons, commodities, or intelligence from one place or person to another. The con-comitant of this concept is the principle approved by the Supreme Court of the United States
that 'importation into one State from another is the indispensable element,
the test, of interstate commerce.' International Textbook Co. v. Pigg,
217 U.S., 91.
"The business in which the appellants were engaged as we have seen,
was the giving of exhibitions of baseball. A game of baseball is not susceptible of being transferred. The players, it is true, travel from place to place
in interstate commerce, but they are not the game. Not until they come into
contact with their opponents on the baseball field and the contest opens
does the game come into existence. It is local in its beginning and in its end.
Nothing is transferred in the process to those who patronize it. The exertions of skill and agility which they witness may excite in them pleasurable
emotions just as might a view of a beautiful picture or a masterly performance of some drama, but the game effects no exchange of things
according to the meaning of 'trade and commerce' as defined above.
"The transportation in interstate commerce of the players and the paraphernalia used by them was but an incident to the main purpose of the
appellants, namely, the production of the game. It was for it they were
in business-not for the purpose of transferring players, balls and uniforms. The production of the game was the Dominant thing in their activities. In Hooper v. California, 155 U.S., 648, the Supreme Court of the
United States was asked to hold that because an insurance corporation in
effecting a marine insurance policy used some of the instrumentalities of
commerce, it was engaged in that commerce, but the court refused to yield
to the argument, and said: 'It ignores the real distinction upon which the
general rule and its exceptions are based, and which consists in the difference between interstate commerce or the instrumentality thereof on the one
side and the mere incidents which may attend the carrying on of such commerce on the other;' and the court held that the business of marine insurance was not commerce, irrespective of the fact that some of its incidents
were. Consult also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S., 168; New York Life Insurance
Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S., 389. So here, baseball is not commerce, though
some of its incidents may be.
"Suppose a law firm in the City of Washington sends its members to
3269 Fed. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1920).

4Id. at 684.
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points in different States to try lawsuits; they would travel, and probably
carry briefs and records, in interstate commerce. Could it be correctly
said that the firm in the trial of the lawsuits was engaged in trade and commerce? Or take the case of a lecture bureau, which employs persons to
deliver lectures before Chautauqua gatherings at points in different states.
It would be necessary for the lecturers to travel in interstate commerce in
order that they might fulfill their engagements, but would it not be an
unreasonable stretch of the ordinary meaning of the words to say that the
bureau was engaged in trade or commerce? If a game of baseball before a
concourse of people who pay for the privilege of witnessing it is trade or
commerce, then the college teams who play football where an admission
fee is charged engage in an act of trade or commerce. But the act is not
trade or commerce-it is sport. The fact that the appellants produce baseball games as a source of profit, large or small, can not change the character of the games. They are still sport, not trade." 5
The opinion of the Court of Appeals did not conclude upon resolving
this basic query. The court proceeded with a further consideration of the
problem in the following language:
"This brings us to consider whether or not the restrictions which appellee
says resulted in the monopolization denounced by the statute affected
illegally the interstate features of appellee's business, that is, the movement of its players and those of the other clubs of the Federal League and
their paraphernalia from place to place in the league's circuit; for it is well
settled that persons not engaged in interstate commerce may be guilty of
violating the statute by illegally interfering with those who are so engaged.
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S., 274, 297; United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290; Northern Securities Company v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197. The statute does not apply 'where the trade or commerce affected is interstate, unless the effect thereon is direct, not merely
indirect.' United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 542. If the necessary effect
is but incidentally or indirectly to restrict the commerce, 'while its chief
result is to foster the trade and increase the business of those who make
and operate it, it is not violative of the law.' United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 173 Fed., 177, 188; Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S., 578, 592;
Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S., 604, 618; United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S., 505, 568; and Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 211, 244.
"Generally speaking, every player was required to contract with his
club that he would serve it for one year and would enter into a new contract 'for the succeeding season at a salary to be determined by the parties
to such contract.' The quoted part is spoken of as the 'reserve clause,' and
it is found, in effect, in the contracts of the minor league players as well
as in those of the major league players. For his services each player was
given a certain consideration, and for consenting to the reserve clause,
another consideration, both of which were set forth in his contract. It is
provided in the rules adopted by the leagues and in the National Agree5 Id. at 684-85.
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ment that if a player violates the reserve clause-is guilty of 'contractjumping,--he shall be punished by being treated as ineligible to serve
in any club of the leagues until he has been formally reinstated, and a list
of such ineligible players is kept by the leagues.
"The number of players which each club was permitted to employ was
limited to twenty-two. It is admitted that this was a reasonable number and
that none of the clubs retained more players than it needed. The number
of skilled players available did not equal the demand, and clubs within
the appellant leagues were competing among themselves for first-class
players. One of the directors of the appellee admitted that if his club had
to compete for public favor with the appellants it undoubtedly would
have been driven to the ranks of the latter for many of its players. If the
reserve clause did not exist, the highly skilful players would be absorbed
by the more wealthy clubs, and thus some clubs in the league would so far
outstrip others in playing ability that the contests between the superior
an inferior clubs would be uninteresting and the public would refuse to
patronize them. By means of the reserve clause and provisions in the rules
and regulations, said one witness, the clubs in the National and American
Leagues are more evenly balanced, the contests between them are made
attractive to the patrons of the game, and the success of the clubs more
certain. The reserve clause and the publication of the ineligible lists, together with other restrictive provisions, had the effect of deterring players
from violating their contracts, and hence the Federal League and its constituent clubs, of which the appellee was one, were unable to obtain
players who had contracts with the appellants; in other words, these things
had the intended effect, viz., of preventing players from disregarding their
obligations. On these provisions, all having for their purpose the preservation by each club of its necessary quota, and no more, of players- rests
the gravamen of appellee's case. It must be obvious that the restrictions
thus imposed relate directly to the conservation of the personnel of the
clubs, and did not directly affect the movement of the appellee in interstate
commerce. Whatever effect, if any, they had was incidental, and therefore did not offend against the statute."8
Upon writ of error the matter came before the Supreme Court of the
United States.
The Court of Appeals was sustained. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the
opinion of the Court, stating in part:
"The decision of the court of appeals went to the root of the case, and,
if correct, makes it unnecessary to consider other serious difficulties in the
way of the plaintiff's recovery. A summary statement of the nature of the
business involved will be enough to present the point. The clubs composing the Leagues are in different cities, and, for the most part, in different
states. The end of the elaborate organizations and suborganizations that
are described in the pleadings and evidence is that these clubs shall play
against one another in public exhibitions for money, one or the other club
6 1d. at 686-88.
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crossing a state line in order to make the meeting possible. When, as the
result of these contests, one club has won the pennant of its League and
another club has won the pennant of the other League, there is a final competition for the world's championship between these two. Of course, the
scheme requires constantly repeated traveling on the part of the clubs,
which is provided for, controlled, and disciplined by the organizations, and
this, it is said, means commerce among the states. But we are of the opinion that the court of appeals was right.
"The business is giving exhibitions of baseball, which are purely state
affairs. It is true that, in order to attain for these exhibitions the great
popularity that they have achieved, competitions must be arranged between clubs from different cities and states. But the fact that, in order to
give the exhibitions, the Leagues must induce free persons to cross state
lines, and must arrange and pay for their doing so, is not enough to change
the character of the business. According to the distinction insisted upon in
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 655, 39 L.ed. 297, 300, 5 Inters. Com.
Rep. 610, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207, the transport is a mere incident, not the
essential thing. That to which it is incident, the exhibition, although made
for money, would not be called trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words. As it is put by the defendant, personal effort, not
related to production, is not a subject of commerce. That which, in its consummation, is not commerce, does not become commerce among the states
because the transportation that we have mentioned takes place. To repeat
the illustrations given by the court below, a firm of lawyers sending out
a member to argue a case, or the Chautauqua lecture bureau sending out
lecturers, does not engage in such commerce because the lawyer or lecturer
goes to another state.
"If we are right, the plaintiff's business is to be described in the same
way; and the restrictions by contract that prevented the plaintiff from
getting players to break their bargains, and the other conduct charged
against the defendants, were not an interference with commerce among
the states.
'7
"Judgment affirmed."
For a period of 27 years the Federal Baseball decision stood unchallenged and generally regarded as authority for the immunity of all professional sports from the impact of the anti-trust laws. Apparently the
nature of the immunity was given little analysis. Sports were spoken of as
being "exempt" from the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The precise position
which sports occupied was immaterial as long as no attempt was made to
invoke the acts with respect to sports operations.
In 1949 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rendered opinions in Gardella v. Chandler,' which precipitated a multiplicity
of law suits. Gardella, a baseball player, had violated the renewal option
7 Supra note 1.

8 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
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afforded by the "reserve clause" of his contract with'the New York Giants,
a member of the National League, by contracting with and playing for a
team in the Mexican League. For such conduct the Commissioner of Baseball placed Gardella on the ineligible list and he was unable to obtain employment as a player in the United States when his Mexican venture paled.
He brought suit against the Commissioner and others challenging the use
of the reserve clause as a violation of the anti-trust statutes. The United
States District Court granted a motion to dismiss the action, relying upon
the federal baseball decision.' The Court of Appeals by vote of two judges
to one remanded the case for trial upon the merits, each of the three judges
(Chase, Frank and Hand) rendering separate opinions, no one of which
agreed with the other.
Justice Chase expressed his belief that Federal Baseball was still controlling law and that the sale of radio and television rights, despite developments in those fields of communication did not constitute a material difference from the sale of the exclusive right to send "play by play" descriptions of the games interstate over telegraph wires, a feature which was
present in the Federal Baseball case. Justice Hand considered the difference between the telegraphing of that time (1922) and present day radio
or television to be so great as for practical purposes to make a difference
in kind. He believed it to be necessary to remand the case to determine
whether all of the interstate activities of the defendants-those, which were
thought insufficient before, in conjunction with broadcasting and television
-together form a large enough part of the business to impress upon it an
interstate character.
Justice Frank was not as temperate, as his benchmates. In his view
recent decisions of the Supreme Court had completely destroyed the vitality of Federal Baseball and had left that case but an "impotent zombie."
The "reserve clause" was likened to "peonage."' 0
An out of court settlement of the Gardella case deprived the United
States Supreme Court of the opportunity of being heard upon the matter.
To many, however, it was a foregone conclusion as to what that Court
would do when baseball next came before it. With anticipatory hope, sired
by Gardella, several baseball players rushed their grievances into the courtrooms. In the United States District Court in the Southern District of California, George Earl Toolson, dissatisfied with the assignment of his contract from Newark to Binghamton, complained against the New York
Yankees and their farm system which embraced both the assignor and assignee clubs." Jack Corbett and the El Paso Club filed suit in the United
9Supra note 1.
3o Supra note 8 at 409.
11 Toolson v. New York Yankees, 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952).
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States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against the Commissioner of Baseball, the National League, the Cincinnati team and others
protesting the action of the defendants in respecting the "reserve clause"
of a contract which bound Corbett to a team in the Mexican League.' In
the Southern District of Ohio, Walter J. Kowalski filed an action against
the Commissioner of Baseball and others complaining that through the use
of players' contracts and agreements he was deprived of the reasonable
value of his services and the opportunities for professional promotion.'8
The complaints were all dismissed by the district courts. Each dismissal
was upheld upon appeal by the United States Courts of Appeal.
Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court in each
case. The cases were consolidated for hearing and decided by common
opinion rendered in Toolson v. New York Yankees.'" The opinion states:
"Without re-examination of the underlying issues, the judgments below
are affirmed on the authority of the Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, supra, so far as that decision determines that Congress had no intention of including the business
of baseball within the scope of the federal anti-trust laws."' 5
The sports world found great relief in the Toolson decision. Although
the action had involved only the "business of baseball" the holding did not
indicate that there was any particular facet of that sport which had saved
baseball or which made it unique. It was determined that Congress in enacting anti-trust legislation had not intended to include the business of
baseball within the scope of the Acts. Predicated upon congressional intent
the decision could reasonably be expected to apply to any sports enterprise
organized and operated upon a basis similar to baseball. An intent could
not be imputed to Congress to exclude baseball and include hockey or football. The United States District Courts so interpreted the decision and dismissed complaints which had been filed involving boxing and football. The
boxing question was the first to find its way into the Supreme Court, coming up under the Expediting Act.' 6 The case, United States v. International
Boxing Club of New York,' was a civil anti-trust action brought by the
government in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York.'8 The complaint charged the defendant fight promoters with
monopolization of professional championship boxing contests. Substantiat12 Corbett v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1953).

13 Kowalski v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1953).

14 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
15lId. at 357.
1632 STAT. 823 (1903), 15 U.S.C.

17348 U.S. 236 (1955).
18 123 F. Supp. 525 (1954).

§ 29 (1952).
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ing allegations recited leasehold rights upon the principal arenas where
championship contests might be held, and the employment of "return
match" and "exclusive service" contracts to control the athletes. The interstate features of the business were stressed by enumeration of the activities
which impinged upon recognized interstate functions such as radio, television, travel and motion picture distribution. It was contended that receipts from sale of radio, television and motion picture rights represented
on the average 25 per cent of total revenue and in some instances exceeded
revenue derived from the sale of admission tickets. The Supreme Court
framed the issues thusly:
"The question thus presented is whether the defendants' business as described in the complaint-the promotion of professional championship boxing contests on a multistate basis, coupled with the sale of rights to televise,
broadcast, and film the contests for interstate transmission--constitutes
'trade and commerce among the several states' within the meaning of the
Sherman Act.""9
The Court answered its interrogatory in the affirmative, Chief Justice
Warren stating in the opinion of the Court:
"Apart from Federal Baseball and Toolson, it would be sufficient, we
believe, to rest on the allegation that over 25 % of the revenue from championship boxing is derived from interstate operations through the sale of
radio, television, and motion picture rights." (citing cases)
"Notwithstanding these decisions, the defendants contend that they
are exempt from the Sherman Act under the rule of stare decisis. They, like
the defendants in the Shubert case, base this contention on Federal Baseball and Toolson. But they would be content with a more restrictive interpretation of Federal Baseball and Toolson than the defendants in the Shubert case. The Shubert defendants argue that Federal Baseball and Toolson
immunized all businesses built around the live presentation of local exhibitions. The defendants in the instant case argue that Federal Baseball and
Toolson immunized only such businesses that involve exhibitions of an athletic nature. We cannot accept either argument.
"For the reasons stated in the Toolson opinion and restated in United
States v. Shubert, 75 S. Ct. 277, Toolson neither overruled Federal Baseball nor necessarily reaffirmed all that was said in Federal Baseball. Instead, 'without re-examination of the underlying issues,' (346 U.S. 356,
74 S. CL 79) the court adhered to Federal Baseball 'so far as that decision
determines that Congress had no intention of including the business of
baseball within the scope of the Federal anti-trust laws.' We have held
today in the Shubert case that Toolson is not authority for exempting
other businesses merely because of the circumstance that they are also
based on the performance of local exhibitions. That ruling is fully applicable here.
19 348 US. 240 (1995).
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"Moreover, none of the factors underlying the Toolson decision are
present in the instant case. At the time the Government's complaint was
filed, no court had ever held that the boxing business is not subject to the
antitrust laws. Indeed, this Court's decision in the Hart case, less than a
year after the Federal Baseball decision, clearly established that Federal
Baseball could not be relied upon as a basis for exemption for other segments of the entertainment business, athletic or otherwise. Surely there is
nothing in the Holmes opinion in the Hart case to suggest, even remotely,
that the Court was drawing a line between athletic and nonathletic entertainment. Nor do we see the relevance of such a distinction for the purpose
of determining what constitutes 'trade or commerce among the several
States.' The controlling consideration in Federal Baseball and Hart was
instead a very practical one-the degree of interstate activity involved in
the particular business under review. It follows that stare decisis cannot
help the defendants here; for, contrary to their argument, Federal Baseball did not hold that all businesses based on professional sports are outside the scope of the antitrust laws. The issue confronting us is, therefore,
not whether a previously granted exemption should continue but whether
an exemption should be granted in the first instance. And that issue is for
Congress to resolve, not this Court. See United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 561, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1178, 88 L. Ed.
1440.,,2o

Football had been brought into the legal arena by an action instituted
by William Radovich against the National Football League and its various
member teams, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Division."' The complaint was filed shortly
after the Gardella opinions.' It recites that Radovich, a professional football player who was under contract to the Detroit team of the National
Football Club, "jumped" his contract and played for two years with the
Los Angeles Dons, a member team of the rival All America Conference.
Allegation is made that the National Football League attempted to monopolize the business of professional football and to eliminate the All America
Conference. In order to effect such purpose a uniform players' contract
was adopted which incorporated a "reserve clause" binding the player to
the club with which he originally signed. Sanctions against the violation of
the "reserve clause" were imposed in the form of "black-listing." It is
alleged that Radovich was "black-listed" by the National Football League
for playing in the All America Conference and that by reason of such interdiction he was denied employment as a player-coach in the Pacific Coast
League, alleged to be an affiliate of the National Football League. Damages
at the statutory trebled amount aggregated $105,000.00.
20

21
2

id. at 241-43.
Radovich v. National Football League, 231 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1956).
Supra note 8.
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A motion to dismiss the complaint was held under submission when
certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court in the Toolson
case.2 Upon the decision in Toolson that Federal Baseball was still the law
insofar as it determined that Congress had no intention of including the
business of baseball within the scope of the federal anti-trust laws, the
district court drew the obvious inference that Congress must also have had
no intention of including the comparable business of football. The Radovich case was dismissed upon citation of Federal Baseball and Toolson.
Appeal was taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. While the matter was under review the boxing case was decided
by the United States Supreme Court. The general positions adopted by the
contesting parties and the resolution of such contentions are expressed in
the opinion of the Court of Appeals in sustaining the dismissal. (Radovich
v. National Football League.)I
"The League relies on Toolson and its parent, Federal Baseball Club v.
National League, 259 U.S. 200. Radovich says the International Boxing
case governs and his complaint should not have been dismissed. Which of
the two tides catches professional football? We confess that the strength
of the pull of both cases is about equal.
"Federal Baseball v. National League survived in Toolson, we believe,
only because of the historical indulgence of the Congress in not specifically
bringing the sport under the anti-trust acts for 30 years after the former
decision was announced. Radovich says United States v. International
Boxing means that only the professional sport of baseball is left with an
immunity from the application of The Sherman and Clayton Acts and that
the immunity of baseball is really a historical accident. It is a good argument.
"If our first step is correct: that we have the right to compare, then
the second one is obvious. Football is a team sport. Its operation has just
about the same aspects as baseball. Boxing is an individual sport. In professional football, very good arguments do exist for the indulgence of restraints on individual players. Of course, such indulgence could not stand
against the positive commands of the Congress. In boxing, arguments for
restraints on the individual's right to contract seem rather hollow.
"Further, it appears reasonable to us to assume that if Congressional
indulgence extended to and saved baseball from regulation, then the indulgence extended to other team sports."2The distinction between Boxing and team sports which the Court recognized, had been urged by counsel for the National Football League as a
differentiating note between the Boxing and Baseball cases. It was con23 Supra note 14.
2 Supra note 21.
2

5Id.

at 622.
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tended that team sports such as baseball and football are dependent upon
close competition on the field of play for popular acceptance and survival.
Such competition can only be provided by contests between teams of equal
strength. League organization and inter-play designed to foster rivalry
constitutes the lure for sports fans. Player control was essential to assure
an even distribution of talent in order to supply the team balance which
would provide competitive exhibitions. Unevenly balanced teams during
the early days of baseball had discouraged patronage and resulted in financial loss. To overcome such a disastrous condition the "reserve clause" and
other player controls were adopted. These devices were peculiar to team
sports enterprises and found no place in the staging of boxing exhibitions.
Placing all championship fighters under the aegis of one group of promoters could find no justification. It was monopoly for monopoly's sake.
A petition to the United States Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari
was filed on behalf of Radovich. The Department of Justice of the United
States Government offered a supporting memorandum as Amicus Curiae.
The Writ issued.
The interjection of the government into the case brought about an
amusing circumstance. The attorneys for the government, intent upon
denying to Boxing the benefits of the Baseball decisions, had made some
positive observations in their brief filed in International Boxing, which observations were most consonant with the position which football was urging. In the boxing brief the government had argued:
"The gravamen of the complaint in the Federal Baseball case was the
alleged illegality of the so-called 'reserve clause' in the players' contracts,
under which a player, once he signs his first contract with organized baseball, is precluded from ever playing for another club unless he is sold or
released ....The holding in Federal Baseball that baseball was not interstate commerce had the practical effect of insulating the reserve clause
from attack under the Sherman Act....
"In determining whether there are practical reasons for applying the
doctrine of stare decisis here, so that the exemption from the anti-trust laws
which baseball now has (as a result of the reaffirmance of Federal Baseball
in Toolson) should be extended to boxing, the inherently different economic characteristics of the two sports should also be borne in mind.
Organized baseball is a tightly integrated organization of 382 clubs
(grouped into two major and forty-nine minor leagues) . . . which play

many games each season. But, unlike most businesses, successful baseball
operation requires that the competing teams cooperate with each other to
insure that no one team attains too great superiority over its competitors.
...
For, unless all teams in the league are of relatively equal playing ability,
public interest soon wanes.

'. .

. Single exhibitions, however closely con-

tested, do not maintain public interest unless they are a part of a larger
drama-the quest of a championship.' . .. The reserve clause which has
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been described as the 'keystone of the entire structure of professional baseball'... is designed to achieve this equality among clubs, for by tying
players to particular teams it prevents the wealthier clubs from buying up
all the leading players."
The plain import of the government's brief in Boxing was that the "reserve clause," grounded in the peculiar feature of the baseball business,
was a reasonable restraint and did not offend against the anti-trust laws.
Specifically it was stated that "Federal Baseball... had the practical effect
of insulating the reserve clause from attack under the Sherman Act." This
was also the argument of professional football. The status of baseball before the anti-trust courts had not been attained by judicial fiat but had
evolved from a long trial which had educed testimony as to the entire
operatioh of baseball, and in particular the reasons and surrounding circumstances leading to the adoption of the "reserve clause" and the functions of the clause. The Court of Appeals in Federal Baseball must have
considered the propriety of the "reserve clause" in order to make the
observation:
"If the reserve clause did not exist the highly skillful players would be
absorbed by the more wealthy clubs, and thus some clubs in the league
would so far out-strip others in playing ability that the contests between
the superior and inferior clubs would be uninteresting and the public would
refuse to patronize them."28
This statement was a part of the decision which in the opinion of the
Supreme Court:
"Went to the root of the case."-T
When Federal Baseball was challenged in the Toolson deliberations,
the Supreme Court affirmed Federal Baseball "without reexamination of
the underlying issues." In the opinion of Justice Frankfurter the "underlying issues" to which the Court had reference were "the constituents of
baseball in relation to the Sherman Law. ' 28 The most celebrated "constituent of baseball" was the "reserve clause." Obviously it had been before
the courts and had not been found to be offensive.
Had not Chief Justice Warren made the same observation in United
States v. Shubert,' where referring to Federal Baseball, he commented:
"For over 30 years there had stood a decision of this court specifically fixing the status of the baseball business under the antitrust laws and more
particularly the validity of the so-called 'reserve clause. "30
26

Supra note 3.
Supra note 1.
28
Supra note 17.
27

29 348 U.S. 222 (1955).
Sold. at 229.
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The Radovich case brought professional football before the Supreme
Court under legal circumstances which paralleled the courses of Toolson,
Corbett and Kowalski. The complaint in each instance had charged an attempt to monopolize a professional sport through the instrumentalities of
league organization, the employment of a uniform players contract embodying a "reserve clause" which wedded the player to the club which
first took him under contract, and the sanction of suspension for a violation of the "reserve clause." Each complaint had been dismissed in the
District Court and each dismissal had been sustained by a Court of
Appeals.
Football urged the position that it presented a pattern of organization
and operation identical with that which baseball had offered for judicial
scrutiny. It felt that it could justly claim the benefits of the Baseball decisions under the doctrine of stare decisis since in the lexicon of Justice
Frankfurter it "differed not one legal jot or tittle" from such sport in its
constituents. The dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter in the Boxing
case8 1 was cited as being here truly opposite.
Realistically, football harbored no illusion of "exemption" from the
acts and declaimed the confusing employment of the term "exemption" as
applied to baseball or anyone else. Football had already been informed by
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in United States v. National Football League,8 2 that it was immaterial
whether football itself was engaged in interstate commerce, it could violate
the anti-trust laws by unreasonable restraints affecting radio, an obvious
instrumentality of interstate commerce. It felt that baseball was in the
same position and could be charged with any acts which resulted in the unreasonable restraint of an admitted field of interstate activity such as radio
or television. It contended merely that certain restrictive aspects of the
sports of baseball and football which concerned the internal operation of
such sports were not within the orbit of the acts. Congress had referred to
such aspects as those "solely related to the promotion of competition on
the playing field."8 3
The representatives of the Department of Justice who had in the Boxing
case construed Federal Baseball as having "the practical effect of insulating the reserve clause from attack under the Sherman Act" could now
only construe Federal Baseball and Toolson as being applicable solely to
"the business of baseball," a form of endeavor unrelated to any other type
of activity. The position taken was so extreme as to invite an interrogatory
31 Supra note 17 at 248-51.

32116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
88 H.R. REP. No. 2002 (Organized Baseball), 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
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of justice Brennan as to whether "soft-ball" might be entitled to the benefit
of the decisions. Counsel for the Government was compelled to admit that
he could not answer the question from the position which he occupied, apparently unaware that the composition of the ball in use today in professional baseball differs materially from that which had been employed when
the game was legally dissected in 1922.
The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the Radovich complaint
by the district court.34 Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court,
stating in part:
"Respondents' contention, boiled down, is that agreements similar to those
complained of here, which have for many years been used in organized baseball, have been held by this Court to be outside the scope of the anti-trust
laws. They point to Federal Baseball and Toolson, supra, both involving
the business of professional baseball, asserting that professional football
has embraced the same techniques which existed in baseball at the time of
the former decision. They contend that stare decisis compels the same result
here. True, the umbrella under which respondents hope to stand is not so
large as that contended for in United States v. International Boxing Club,
supra, nor in United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955). There they
would have had us extend Federal Baseball to boxing and the theater.
Here respondents say that the contracts and sanctions which baseball and
football find it necessary to impose have no counterpart in other businesses
and that, therefore, they alone are outside the ambit of the Sherman Act.
In Toolson we continued to hold the umbrella over baseball that was placed
there some 31 years earlier by Federal Baseball. The Court did this because
it was concluded that more harm would be done in overruling Federal Baseball than in upholding a ruling which at best was of dubious'validity. Vast
efforts had gone into the development and organization of baseball since
that decision and enormous capital had been invested in reliance on its permanence. Congress had chosen to make no change. All this, combined with
the flood of litigation that would follow its repudiation, the harassment that
would ensue, and the retroactive effect of such a decision, led the court to
the practical result that it should sustain the unequivocal line of authority
reaching over many years.
"The Court was careful to restrict Toolson's coverage to baseball, following the judgment of Federal Baseball only so far as it 'determines that
Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the
scope of the federal anti-trust laws.' Supra, at 357. The Court reiterated
this in United States v. Shubert, supra, at 230, where it said, 'In short,
Toolson was a narrow application of the rule of stare decisis.' And again,
in International Boxing Club, it added, 'Toolson neither over-ruled Federal Baseball nor necessarily reaffirmed all that was said in Federal Baseball ....Toolson is not authority for exempting other businesses merely
because of the circumstance that they are also based on the performance of
local exhibitions.' Supra, at 242. Furthermore, in discussing the impact of
3352 U.S. 445 (1957).
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the Federal Baseball decision, the Court made the observation that that
decision 'could not be relied upon as a basis of exemption for other segments of the entertainment business, athletic or otherwise... The controlling consideration in Federal Baseball ...was. .. the degree of interstate activity involved in the particular business under review.' Id., at 242243. It seems that this language would have made it clear that the Court
intended to isolate these cases by limiting them to baseball, but since Toolson and Federal Baseball are still cited as controlling authority in antitrust
actions involving other fields of business, we now specifically limit the rule
there established to the facts there involved, i.e., the business of organized
professional baseball. As long as the Congress continues to acquiesce we
should adhere to--but not extend-the interpretation of the Act made in
those cases. We did not extend them in boxing or the theater because we
believed that the volume of interstate business in each-the rationale of
Federal Baseball-was such that both activities were within the Act. Likewise, the volume of interstate business involved in organized football places
it within the provisions of the Act.
"If this ruling is unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical, it is sufficient to
answer, aside from the distinctions between the businesses, that were we
considering the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate we
would have no doubts. But Federal Baseball held the business of baseball
outside the scope of the Act. No other business claiming the coverage of
those cases has such an adjudication. We, therefore, conclude that the orderly way to eliminate error or discrimination, if any there be, is by legislation and not by court decision. Congressional processes are more accommodative, affording the whole industry hearings and an opportunity to assist
in the formulation of new legislation. The resulting product is therefore
more likely to protect the industry and the public alike. The whole scope of
congressional action would be known long in advance and effective dates
for the legislation could be set in the future without the injustices of retroactivity and surprise which might follow court action. Of course, the doctrine of Toolson and Federal Baseball must yield to any congressional
action and continues only at its sufferance. This is not a new approach. See
Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 255 (1942); compare United
States v. Rutkin, 343 U.S. 130 (1952)."
"We think that Radovich is entitled to an opportunity to prove his charges.
Of course; we express no opinion as to whether or not respondents have,
in fact, violated the antitrust laws, leaving that determination to the trial
court after all the facts are in."35
Editorial comment and congressional activity would indicate that the
rationale of Radovich is not fully apparent. The consternation is not illfounded. It would seem that when the Supreme Court in deciding Toolson
construed Federal Baseball as a case determining legislative intent it precluded itself from rendering a decision such as Radovich. Surely the Court
could not impute to Congress the intent to discriminate in favor of baseball
-3 352 U.S. at 449-54.
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by passing legislation which was inapplicable to the business of baseball
but applicable to all other sports regardless of their similarity to baseball
in format and operation. From the expressions of today's Congress it is
apparent that no such intent could ever have been imputed to it and it is
extremely questionable that a predecessor legislature could be so read.
Legislative intent is forgotten in Radovich and the criterion substituted
is rather one of extent-the degree of interstate activity involved in the
staging of professional football exhibitions.
In the Radovich decision the Court quotes from itself in Shubert "The
controlling consideration in Federal Baseball-was... the degree of interstate activity involved in the particular business under review." It refers
to "the volume of interstate business" as "the rationale of Federal Baseball." In vain do we scan the Toolson opinion for any like construction of
Federal Baseball.
In Radovich is found the conclusion that "the volume of interstate business involved in organized football places it within the provisions of the
Act." In view of the circumstance that the question of the propriety of the
dismissal of a complaint was the matter under review, the only basis for
determining "the volume of interstate business involved in organized football" would be the allegations of the complaint. The Radovich complaint
contains some very general and indefinite allegations of "lucrative" radio
and television contracts. From such allegations the Court is able to determine that "the volume of interstate business involved in organized football
places it within the provisions of the Act." Yet in reviewing Toolson the
same Court had before it allegations of interstate activity far more definite
and substantial, but apparently did not even consider whether such allegations would support a conclusion that the volume of interstate business
involved in organized baseball was sufficient to bring that activity within
the embrace of the anti-trust statutes. The pertinent Toolson allegation is
the following:
"That the aforesaid production of games and narration by radio and transmittal by television to the outside public in the various states of the United
States is a substantial part of the business of professional baseball in that
the receipts from such activities exceeds $1,000,000.00 each year and exceeds the
sum of 20% of the net profits of professional baseball each
0
year." 6
The opinion of Justice Clark in Radovich points out that concern as to
the effect of an adverse ruling upon baseball was one of the controlling
considerations in the Toolson decision. Consistency would invoke the same
concern when dealing with a related business. Undoubtedly the same flood
86 Toolson Complaint Par. IX.
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of litigation, the same harassment and the same retroactive effect feared
in Toolson would ensue upon the repudiation of football's "reserve clause."
The illogic of the majority opinion is further accentuated by the converse position of Mr. Justice Harlan upon the preservation of the status
quo. In suggesting that the undoing of what was started by Federal Baseball should be left to Congress, Mr. Justice Clark takes no heed of the fact
that his opinion is itself a departure from Federal Baseball. Stare decisis
would compel that Federal Baseball be followed to its logical result until
the Congress should determine otherwise, if the resolution of the problem
is to be in fact left to Congress. How much more cogent is the reasoning of
Mr. Justice Harlan, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins:
"If the situation resulting from the baseball decisions is to be changed, I
think it far better to leave it to be dealt with by Congress than for this
court to becloud the situation further, either by making untenable distinctions between baseball and
other professional sports, or by discriminatory
fiat in favor of baseball."'37
Several sports writers and a former great baseball player have arrogated the mantle of exigetes to inform us that the Supreme Court has indicted football by reason of its player "draft." It is true that the player
selection system was mentioned by the Honorable Chief Justice during the
oral argument of the Radovich case and the fact was publicized in the newspapers. However, it was promptly pointed out by counsel for defendants
that the propriety of the draft was not in issue. No mention of the draft
was made in the complaint nor any charge that Radovich was in any manner affected by the draft; the fact being that Radovich had never been
drafted. The Chief Justice conceded that his knowledge of the existence
of a draft had been derived from the newspapers. The Court carefully evidenced the absence of any influence by such feature in a footnote to the
principal opinion:
"Consideration of basic differences, if any, between the baseball and football businesses, such as the football draft system, use of league affiliations,
training facilities and techniques, etc., is not necessary to this decision."
Since the ruling of the Supreme Court in InternationalBoxing, a decision respecting the business of professional basketball has been rendered
in which Boxing was followed. The action was commenced in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York by the Washington Professional Basketball Corporation against the National Basketball Association.38 The complaint contended that a conspiracy foreclosed
37

Supra note 34 at 456.

38 Civ. No. 101-355.
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the plaintiff from participation in the business of basketball. A motion to
dismiss was denied, with the citation of InternationalBoxing.
With the Boxing decision supplemented by Radovich, legal prognosis
in the field of sports becomes relatively simple. It is a safe prediction that
the courts will deny to all sports other than baseball the benefits of Federal
Baseball and Toolson. The Supreme Court is apparently insistent that
Congress assume the task of unraveling the snarl. It is also not improbable
that the sports-minded Department of Justice will do its utmost to give all
sporting activities a day in court. At the Supreme Court hearing on football, government counsel renewed acquaintance with the sports writers
covering the proceedings by reminding them that he had met them the
previous year at the Boxing hearing and took his leave with the comment
that he would see them next year at the hockey hearing.-9

39 The National Hockey League Players' Association fled a $3,000,000 anti-trust suit
against the six National Hockey League clubs in New York in October, 1957. The association
is asking to void the standard player contract.

